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I Controversies over the Materialistic Interpretation 
of History in the Early Part of the Nineteen-Twenties 
I t is since the very beginning of this century that problems such as the role 
consciousness has played in history and the active part to be played by the upper 
structure have been discussed from the viewpoint of bourgeois idealists in opposi-
tion to Marxism. We can see the most typical example of this in Max Weber's 
Ethics of Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904). Nevertheless this problem 
has not been directly taken up by any Marxist for a long time since then. Because 
of the thesis expounded in the illustrious work, Materialistic Interpretation 'If History 
which had been formulated in the Critique of Political Economy by Marx, consci-
ousness was· dealt with as a mere reflection of existence and emphasis on the role 
of consciousness had never been seriously considered, being regarded as bourgeois 
idealism in opposition to the materialistic interpretation of history. It was, how-
ever, only from 1923 that these problems began to gain a position in the materi-
alistic interpretation of history and some Marxists began to make are-appraisal 
of these problems. We can see some such keen-sighted work or forerunners' 
achievements in History and Class-Consciousness by Lukacs and Marxism and Philosophy 
by Korsch. 
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I attempted to search for the significance of these two works in the history of 
thought in several previous brief essays and have made the following point clear: 
that the purpose of these works--Lukacs' book written when the Hungarian 
Revolution collapsed in 1919 and Korsch's book written when the German Revo-
lution broke down in 19l8--·viewed in relation to the Marxist family-tree, was 
to make a re-evaluation of Marx's Thesis on Feuerbach against objectivism based 
on the dialectic of nature in Anti-Duhring by Engels I). Above all other things 
"materialistic dialectic should be revolutionary dialectic" according to Lukacs who 
was aiming to reproduce the proletarian revolution in Europe by criticising the 
Second International'). I t was necessary for that purpose that contemplation, 
which had been transformed into bourgeois ideology maintained by social demo-
crats, had first to be confronted. The main current of the II International did in 
fact force its way into history. But because of a lack in the dialectic of conscious-
ness of the subjective entity which could have taken a part in history and because 
it was prejudiced by the natural lawfulness created by capitalist societies, all that 
they could do was nothing but to wait and see the facts they experienced as they 
were3 ). But the important question in this connection is how man and his environ-
ment should confront each other by the dialectic which should build up history and 
create the future. Putting it more concretely, the problem to be solved is 
how should the subjective entity of various classes placed in a fixed relationship of 
production become conscious of the objective environment of history and how should 
each of them interact? The field of conduct (dialectic to produce history) and 
the field of cognition (dialectic to grasp history) are something linked together as 
an entity which can revolutionalise actuality. 
From this standpoint Lukacs made the following criticism of Anti-Duhring by 
Engels. "Engels, setting the way to form through dialectical methodology in 
opposition to metaphysical methodology, made an extremely sharp assertion, saying 
that the inflexibility of a concept (and corresponding object to that concept) would 
dissolve in dialectic. In short, a dialectic is a ceaseless process, changing from 
one stipulation to another, a continual giving up of various oppositions, and their 
inter-transition. Therefore, anyone-sided and inflexible causality should be 
dissolved by such interaction. Now it must be borne in mind that one of the most 
substantial interactions is none other than the dialectic relationship between sub-
jective entity and objective entity in the process of history, but no mention had 
ever been made of this problem by Engels, not to speak of due consideration of it 
in his methodological considerations. But for this prescription, the dialectic 
1) About Lukacs see "Shiso", No. 489, March 1965; about Korsch "Keizai Ronso", Vol. 98, 
No. I, July 1966. 
2) Georg Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbeu.:us,ftsein, Studien iiber manistische Dialektik, Berlin, 1923, 
s. 14. 
3) G. Lukacs, a.a.O., S. 100. 
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methodology would cease to be revolutionary method-even if it is admitted that 
it might contain some variable concepts, they would after all simply have to become 
something superficial. The difference between dialectic and metaphysics lies in 
that, while on the one hand all metaphysical contemplation can not simply be 
anything more than mere making observations because the objective entity to be 
contemplated has to be left unaltered as it is without being even touched and con-
templation in itself remains theoretical and consequently it can not be anything to 
be translated into action, on the other hand the central problem of dialectical 
methodology is nothing but to revolutionalise the realities of life"'). 
Thus, Lukacs proceeded to contemplate that the very dialectic to bring forth 
changes in the realities of life should be concerned not with the mere opposition 
between materialism and ideology but with "the dialectic relationship between 
subjective entity and objective entity in the process of history", and that it must be 
the only element of thought to pave the road to the future of history .. Nevertheless, 
as history has been always ironical, so this very subjective dialectic which was 
brought forward only to criticise the objectivism of the II International was refuted 
by the Marxists of the III International. In regard to this refutation my opinion 
has been expressed to some extent in my little essay "Dialectic of Actions in Karl 
Korsch", but it is Deborin who raised a fairly complete objection to this new 
problem raised by Lukacs. In the Criticism oj Lukacs and his Mar>ism, 1924 Deborin 
gave a good scolding not only to HistolJ' and Class-Consciousness, but to K. Korsch, 
Fogarasi and Reway, who should have been Lukacists, on the ground that they 
were all in a position, being prejudiced ideologically, to deny Engels' dialectic of 
naturalism, and the center of his criticism was then placed on the problem of the 
"Identity of Subject and Object" .or "Identity of Thinking and Existence". Debo-
rin, further adding to his criticism, saying that a train of thought of this kind deviates 
from Marxism, which maintains that theories and thoughts are a reflection of 
reality, continues to make the following criticism, "that according to Lukacs any 
theory in itself, accordingly even cognition, too, is something independent from 
material substance and independent from reality, that Lukacs' grasping of action is 
conceived ideologically in the same way as the theory is conceived, and finally that 
his understanding of dialectic deviates from that of Marx's and Engels' under-
standing. "5) lVloreover, when the active part to be played by consciousness is 
emphasised, it inevitably leads to the voluntarism of Mach which Lukacs had to 
criticise. "The voluntarism of Mach unavoidably leads to recognition of the 
existence of the world of volition. In other words, this is none other than the 
idealism of consciousness and this tendency is also indicated in Lukacs. "6) In as 
4) G. l.ukacs, n.a.O., SS. 15-16. 
5) A. Dcborin, "Lukacs und seine Kritik des Marxismus"~ Arbeiler-Liternlur, Nr. 10, S. 624. 
6) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 625. 
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much as a human being is an existence that behaves consciously in historic reality, 
he is something physical and conscious. However, according to Deborin "these 
features are distinguished as two' separate entities. Accordingly thinking and 
existence are something different from each other and existence exists independendy 
from congnition as an objective entity. Cognition and speculation are a mere. 
reflection of what actually exists."7) If it is true, then it follows that there is no 
necessity to distinguish the dialectic of society, which intrudes into actuality as an 
objective entity from that of nature. 
Indeed it is accepted by Deborin that "the history of nature has been governed 
by a law completelydifferent from that which governs the history of human beings,"B) 
but after all no fundamental difference between these two cases has ever been 
demonstrated. In the same magazine, a criticism by Ladislaus Rudas, "The Class-
Consciousness of Lukacs" was published, which attempted to prove that "the 
point of view held by Lukacs is ideological and agnostic."') It is not known what 
Lukacs' answer to those objections was then, but in a fairly complete book-review 
by him in 1925 in Collected Essays on the History of Socialism and Labour Movements 
which was written to raise objections to the Theory qf Historical MaterialiJm, 1922 by 
N. Bukharin, Lukacs levelled expremely bitter criticism against materialism based 
on natural science til). 
It goes without saying that Deborin, Ludas and Bukharin are all based on the 
same materialism of natural science, but it must be noted that there is a difference 
between Bukharin and Deborin, much wider than that from Rudas. Therefore, 
it is not reasonable to believe that Lukacs' criticism of Bukharin can be taken to be 
his direct answer to Bukharin. Nevertheless, it can be said, viewed from the 
standpoint of Lukacs, that they belong fundamentally speaking, to the followers of 
Bukharin's materialism as far as the controversies during the early part of the 
1920's over the materialistic interpretation of history are concerned. Needless to 
say, the author has at present no intention of describing all the arguments developed 
in full detail in those days in this brief essay. What is intended rather is to find 
the theoretical difference between the subjective dialectic held by Lukacs and the 
materialism based on natural science held by Bukharin in the light of the opposition 
between Lukacs and Bukharin. By doing so it will become possible as a matter 
of course to elucidate from the aspect of the history of thought that the very op-
position of the two ideas--be it in a more refined or in a more weakened form 
7) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 630. 
9) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 632. 
9) L. Rudas, "Die Klassenbewusstseinstheorie von Lukacs", Arbeiter-Literalur, Nr. 10, 1924, SS. 
669-97. 
10) G. Lukacs, "Literaturbericht, N. Bucharin, Theone des historischen Materialismus. Gemein-
verstandliches Lehrbuch der marxistischen Soziologie, 1922'", Archivfur die Geschichte des Sozialismus 
und der Arbeiterbewegung,Jg. 11, 1925, SS. 218-24. 
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--is none other than the backgound from which the same arguments are currently 
springing forth among many Marxists. 
To do so, we must explain the logical structure of the historical dialectic 
conceived by Lukacs out of the underlying ground of the consciousness of urgent 
crisis during his revolutionary days, contrasting it with materialism based on 
natural science. Needless to say, we get such a dialectic as to conceive an idea 
of society in the form of a totality that includes all objective entity, if the identity 
of speculation and existence and subject and object is brought against such an 
objectivism that interprets speculation in terms of existence and objective entity by 
disuniting speculation and existence, subject and object. Consequently it becomes 
something connected with the dialectic of voluntarism and determinism and the 
relationship between teleology and the law of causality. For these reasons it is 
clear that the base of this logical structure was the consciousness of history to cut 
a path from the present to the future and the author hopes to confirm that Lukacs 
occupied an unshakable position in the history of Marxist thought during the 
period of the nineteen-twenties and that his thought constitutes an important 
position in Marxist philosophy even today. 
Yet we can not simply go back to the stage of History and Class-Consciousness 
in the early part of the nineteen-twenties. Going back to history would mean 
grasping the problems at issue as they were in those days and bringing them back to 
the present. This statement would hold true especially in the case of the history 
of thought. In order to determine the present significance of Lukacs, the unsolved 
problems arising out of Histoey and Class-ConsciollsnesJ need to be clarified. An 
argument should always mean to turn outwards from oneself and to make a critical 
study of one's own position. Therefore, the dialectic of subjective entity should 
deal with problematical questions arising out of objective materialism. Putting it 
in other words, Lukacs viewpoint criticising Bukharin must contrariwisely be 
turned back from Bukharin to Lukacs. Once the viewpoint is reversed in this 
way, it then becomes possible to visualise how the dialectic of the "identity of 
subjective and objective entity" in terms of class-consciousness maintained by 
Lukacs is led to be transformed from the "dialectic to produce history" into the 
"dialectic to grasp history", and correspondingly it also becomes possible to under-
stand the reason why the "identity of subjective and objective entity" presupposed 
by Lukacs can be actualised in terms of consciousness and how reforming by con-
sciousness is identified with actual revolution. \'V'hat is now intended by the author 
at this point is to look into the realistic grounds for the dialectic of the "identity 
of subjective and objective entity" conceived by Lukacs. In other words, to do 
so means to demonstrate the realistic and ontological grounds of proletarian class-
consciousness. Viewing it in this way, does it not of necessity lead to acceptance 
of the category of "combined labour" raised by Bukharin--be it based on the 
viewpoint of the materialism of natural science or on the theory of productivity? 
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Of course it does not follow that this collective power which is proposed to provide 
the ground for the existence of society can be conceive simply in terms of objective 
and physical productivity exactly in the way asserted by Bukharin. Is it not 
true that it is not until this idea can be reconceived as an ontological ground for the 
dialectic of reforming history that it becomes possible to grasp a medium by which 
"consciousness is converted into physical force" as asserted by Marx, and from 
which it surely becomes possible to find the way to penetrate through the limits 
of consciousness of Lukacs? 
II Materialism based on Natural Science and 
the Dialectic of History 
Lukacs regarded the essence of Marxism as a state of practical enforcement, 
under which man, who lives in the historical reality of life, being governed by a 
social environment on the one hand and at the same time participating in historical 
actuality as a conscious and subjective entity on the other, was to revolutionalise 
actuality and proceed to build a road to the future. "One of the most important 
functions of historical materialism lies in no sense of the word in pure scientific 
congnition but it lies in the point that it is composed of action or conduct." II) It 
is only from this point of view that the foundation for looking out over the future 
can be provided. This idea is duly evaluated by Josef Revai, who is a critic of 
Lukacs in a review of History and Class-Consciousness. "According to Lukacs it was 
not because the dialectic was elucidated post festum, outside of the historical process, 
but because it was perceived on the basis of the revolutional interaction between 
subjective and objective entity in the midst of the historical process that Marx 
developed his dialectic in the way Copernicus did. Marx brought the future 
into the revolutionary dialectic. Of course it was not in the form of action in 
conformity with natural law or teleogical purposiveness, but in the form of some 
active realities as something inherently prescribing actualities." 12) Needless to 
say, this idea was repeatedly insisted on by Lukacs himself to the effect that "the 
reason why Marxism happens to be the theory of revolution is because it indisputably 
grasps the very essence of its process and because it indicated the trend of essential 
processes of gTeat importance to show the future to come or to produce". 13) If 
true, Marxism ought to be the dialectic of history to produce the future by practical 
means, and it follows that it can not be discussed from the viewpoint of deciding 
whether tbe ultimate factor lies in consciousness or in existence. Whether nature 
11) G. Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenheu.ms.rtsein, 1923, S. 231. 
12) Josef Revai, "Literaturbericht, Georg Lukics, Geschichte uber marxistische Dialektik, 1923", 
Archiv fur die Geschichte des Sozialismus und deT Arbeiterbewegung, Jg. 11, 1925. 
13) G. Lukacs, a.a.O., S. 263. 
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or speculation, each of them is after all nothing but one and the same thing seen 
respectively from two different angles. In this connection Lukacs says as follows: 
"The decisive point which distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois science is not 
whether the dominance of economic causes is duly acknowledged in the interpretation 
of history, but whether the viewpoint of totality is taken or not. The category of 
totality in this sense, i.e. complete and decisive dominance of totality over partiality, 
is nothing more or less than the very essence of Marxist methodology which suc-
ceeded from Hegel and on which Marx formulated his new theory after making a 
complete re-systematisation."!4) When viewed in this way, it ought to be helpful 
to understand why it was not until Lukacs came to hold this view of action or 
practice that he started from the category of the identity of subject and object. 
Needless to say, Bukharin also admitted that man is an entity composing 
society. "It is certainly by men that varied social phenomena are produced. 
Society is composed of men who think, feel, establish purpose and work."!') There-
fore, it is impossible for us to distinguish Lukacs from Bukharin on these grounds. 
Furthermore, it is also a position common to Marxism to maintain that society 
produced by men is an objective and independent entity and is forced to conform 
with law, and as far as this view is concerned, both Lukacs' and Bukharin's views 
are in conformity with F"",·bach and the End oj German Classical Philosopfry, written 
by Engels. According to Bukharin "various social phenomena exist independently 
from human consciousness, sympathy and volition ....... !t is because social products 
as results of human volition do not always keep pace with goals established by 
many people and moreover that because they are frequently found to be even 
contradictory to their goals that the events of social life are independent from 
human volition!'). Such autonomy of objectivity has also been persistently ac· 
cepted by Lukacs. As far as this view is concerned, it is decisively different from 
bourgeois idealism, " .. hich urges the autonomy of individual consciousness. When 
Lukacs developed his "class-consciousness", he started from the idea that "the 
true motive power of history is something independent from human consciousness 
in the psychological senseI7). If so, the one cannot be distinguished from the other 
as far as these two views are concerned. The distinction between subjective 
dialectic and objective materialism lies in whether the relationship between subject 
and object can be broken off or not--whether the subjective entity, although 
being limited within a given social relationship, is to be in turn regarded as some-
thing changing such a relationship, or whether the viewpoint of being a mere 
spectator watching objective natural lawfulness is to be assumed. Or rather, ac-
14) G. Lukacs, 0.0.0., S. 39. 
15) N. Bucharin, Theorie des historischen Materiali.rmus, Gemeinversliindliches Lehrbuch der rnarxislischen 
Soziologie, Hamburg, 1922, S. 25. 
16) N. Bucharin, a,a.O., S. 32. 
] 7) G. Lukacs, a,a,O., S. 58. 
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cording to the viewpoint of the dialectic of subjective and objective entity, man is 
subject to the influence of natural lawfulness, since he can be regarded as an alien-
ated entity in conformity with the nature of material phenomena, and it follows 
that objectivity is something constantly in motion due to contradictions of its own, 
but at the same time it is something to be reduced to human relationships. Thus, 
tbe structure of objectivity in itself ought not to be in the form of nature but in 
the form of something social. (It will be elucidated in the next chapter that the 
sense of 'something social' is very vague according to Lukacs.) If so, it is impossible 
to consider the objective natural lawfulness of society as something inflexible. 
According to Lukacs "History is a record of changes of forms taking place when 
human beings gather together to build up a society, or it is nothing but a history 
of the changes of forms which govern the whole of mutual human relationships, 
starting from economic and physical relationshipsl'>. 
However, since materialism based on natural sicence is likely to fall into 
vulgar Marxism and to be prejudiced by the natural lawfulness produced as the result 
of capitalist society, all they can do is to consider facts that have been experienced 
as they are. This is because reality is not grasped from the viewpoint of changing 
actualities. It was on tbis point that the main point of Lukacs criticism of the 
"Historical Materialism" held by Bukharin was focussed. "Bukharin's theory is 
very similar to materialism of the bourgeois type and of natural science taking on 
the form of a science in the sense of French, and for that reason it obliterates, 
because of its frequent application of this science, one of the most important requisites 
of lVlarxist methodology to reduce every economic and sociological phenomenon a 
mutual social relationship"l'>. If it is true, will it not, from the Lukacs viewpoint, 
lead to a technical argument that will consider natural lawfulness to be something 
fixed and inflexible according to the "materialism" of Bukharin? 
Lukacs says, focussing his criticism upon the autonomy of natural lawfulness 
of technique supported by Bukharin, that "Bukharin is as a matter of fact expecting 
a totally impossible role from technique, and he is doing so in such a way that is 
not applicable to the spirit of dialectical materialism. Bukharin further made a 
statement that the conventional system of social technique prescribes the system of 
all relationships of labour among men ....... The immaturity of ancient exchange 
and the predomin'mce of spontaneous economy are prescribed as results of unde-
veloped techniques ...... Emphasis is placed on the fact that, whenever any change 
takes place in technique, the corresponding change will take place in the division 
of labour within a society, too. "2<'> It is, indeed, true that Bukharin, as far as he 
\8) G. Lukacs, a.a.O., S. 59. 
19) G. Lukacs, "Literaturbericht, N. Bucharin, Theorie des historischen Materialismus. Gemein-
verstandliches Lehrbuch der marxistischen So/.iologie, 1922", Archivfur die Geschichte des Sozz"alismus 
und der Arbeiterbewegung,Jg. II, 1925, S. 217. 
20) G. Lukacs, nLiteraturbericht", S8. 217-18. 
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himself held the Marxist point of view, did not simply accept the idea of regarding 
technique only as something spontaneous. For example, Bukharin bitterly criti-
cised The Position rif Technique in Marxist Economics by Heinrich Kuno, asserting that 
a technique is so connected with natural conditions that the production of a certain 
material will determine the creation of a fixed technique. 
However, because Bukharin himself also applied the aforementioned 'science' 
of natural science to the materialistic interpretation of history, it was impossible for 
him to grasp techniques in themselves in a critical way. This point was cross-
examined by Lukacs as folJows: "Nevertheless, why is it not possible that such 
an appropriate and critical attitude of Bukharin against Kuno should be taken 
against technique? Is not such an idea that the development of a society depends 
on that of technique, even if it may be more refined than its older conception, 
after all erroneous naturalism like the similar theory of Kuno which ended in the 
theory of environment in the 18th and 19th centuries? ..... As far as an autonomous 
technique is taken to provide the basis of development, all we can see in it is that 
it only serves to rebuild a crude naturalism into something more dynamic and 
delicate. The reason is because, if the improvement of technique is not grasped 
as a system of production at a given time, and if its improvement is not explained 
in terms of the development of social forces, then the technique is, as it were to 
be understood as something similar in nature to a principle of worshipping some-
thing transcending and confronting man, just like natural factors such as climate, 
environment and raw materials"). Of course, Lukacs himself has no reason 
whatever to deny the active role of technique, or rather he does accept the improve-
ments of technique in relation to the development of productivity, but technique 
is ultimately ascribed to various economic relationships. "It is because some 
changes do take place in the structure of a society, or in the possibility and condition 
oflabour that technique is decisively forced to change its course of improvement. "22) 
In this way the reason why Bukharin made a very high evaluation of technique 
is because it is reasonable to think that the new productive development of society 
during the period of the establishment of socialism after the Revolution of 1917 
was in itself a mere reflection of historical inevitability which happened to be a 
strikingly significant class-struggle. Bukharin himself put the folJowing descrip-
tion in his introduction: "Some of the problems to which I used to pay almost 
no attention when I was involved in a previous period of urgency began to strike 
me with seriousness at the present stage of revolution.""> Without any historical 
background, arguments would undoubtedly turn out to be abstract. But putting 
this aside, because the characteristic features of the Marxist history of thought 
21) G. Lukacs, "Literaturbericht", S. 219. 
22) G. Lukacs, ~,Literaturbericht", S. 220. 
23) N. Bucharin, a.n.O., S. V. p. 2. 
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in the Soviet Union placing emphasis on natural science permeate throughout 
Bukharin, his idea makes a sharp contrast to that of Lukacs which is based on a 
social dialectic. 
Without taking up all human conduct or actions which revolutionalise ob-
jective entity and by taking an attitude of wait and see as things take place, Bukha-
rin restricted his subject of study just to that of the law of cause and effect in terms 
of natural science. Lukacs, concluding that this attitude is of the same posture 
which used to be held in common by Kant, continues to say as follows: "As far as 
the mathematical relationship or the inevitability of natural law is taken to be a 
doctrine of congnition, such congnition can no longer be anything more than a 
stereotyped relationship or an attitude merely to wait-and-see lawfulness24). Be-
sides, what is peculiar to Lukacs is the view saying that such an attitude explaining 
cognition prescribes the structure of existence of a cognitive entity without remain-
ing within a scientific framework. "The viewpoint of explantion from a wait-and-
see attitude or from a critical attitude tends more and more to get rid of all subjective 
and irrational elements or all that are human from such an attitude. Then, the 
cognitive entity, being farther and farther shut off from man, can not but become 
something purely formalistic25 ). This is, to Lukacs, none other than the same 
posture held by the so-called vulgar Marxists whose viewpoints were inverted to 
take the Neo-Kantian standpoint. 
Revai made the following statement in a review of History and Class-Con.l"Cio-
usness, pointing out the distinctive characteristics of Neo-Kantian Marxism, to the 
effect that "since such study of Marx deals with developments of phenomena in a 
society and history in accordance with the law of causation, it represents various 
individual sciences which are intrinsically and substantially of the same nature as the 
problems of the world-views."") And even an orthodox l'v1arxist, like for instance, 
Plekhanov goes as far as to say that if "a dialectic is to be based on naturalism", the 
mutual interaction of Hegel is to be grasped as a relationship of causality, and that 
"because of its distortion the relationship between the world-mind and history in the 
Hegelian sense must be based on the relationship of the law of causation. "") Such 
a dialectic based on naturalism as pointed out by Revai penetrates through Bukha-
rin's, Materialistic Interpretation of Histo~y and it is added that for Marxism the im-
portant problem to solve is that of pursuing the relationship of causality of social phe-
nomena in conformity with the laws of nature by going thorough the dialectic of 
naturalism maintained by Plekhanov. "We can observe a certain orderliness or 
lawfulness in our social life or in the life ofa human society. However complex and 
diversified social life may be, we do find and accept a fixed lawfulness in it. For 
instance, the more remarkable progress capitalism makes, the faster the labouring 
24) 25) G. Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, S. 141. 
26) 27) J. Revai, "Literaturbericht", S. 227. 
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class grows and develops, the more frequently socialist campaigns spring forth and 
the more extensively Marxist theory is spread."2") In this way, according to Bukha-
rin, it is seen that even the growth of the labouring classes and the theoretical develop-
ment of I\Iarxist theory are all reduced to a natural lawfulness of objectivity. If 
so, is there any possibility of a cognitive entity intervening in the system of the 
natural law of cause and effect? Needless to say, Bukharin denies voluntarism, 
and moreover such a system of causality has nothing to do with teleology. 
Indeed Bukharin himself, quoting as an example the difference between 
"Spiders, bees and architects" given in the theory of labour-process.in Capital which 
is frequently referred to whenever teleology is brought into the discussion, has stated 
that "it is right, viewed from the purposiveness of man, that Marx drew a line 
between human beings and the other world. "29) Even so, Bukharin is opposed ei-
ther to characterise social science with teleology in that way, or to see voluntarism 
intervene there. Bukharin persistently refuses to accept the idea that Stammler 
distinguished social science from natural science as a science of purpose in Economics 
and Laws in the Light of the Materialistic Interpretation of Histocv. The reason is because 
Bukharin thinks that even human volition and consciousness should be interpreted 
through a fixed law of causality. "Even if it is admitted that man can prescribe 
everything consciously by himself and everything in his society can be achieved 
exactly in the way he wishes, what is essentially required for the explanation of 
multiple phenomena is not teleology but the study of causes of those phenomena, i.e. 
the way to find lawfulness in conformity with natural causality. Therefore, the 
distinction between a social science and a natural science is not involved in this 
problem. "30) 
"When the problem of relationships between the two theories of causality and 
teleology in social science was made a big issue in the field of bourgeois social science, 
and when "Veber raised the problem of causality peculiar to social science in the 
'Objectivity of Perception of Social Science and Social Policy', the fact that Bukha-
rin kept himself away from the problems raised by W'eber and consequently the 
attempt to make this problem retrogress back to the stage prior to Weber cannot be 
free from criticism. "31) In this connection Lukacs made no direct objection to 
Bukharin, but if it is grasped that the cognitive entity participates in historical 
reality and that objective actualities move on account of self-contradictions, it is 
impossible to grasp it monistically merely by the single law of natural cause and 
effect. Particularly when the dialectic of the identity of consciousness and existence, 
and subject and object are linked together with the dialectic of totality which intends 
28) N. Bucharin, a.a.O., S. 10. 
29) N. Bucharin, a.a.O., S. 18. 
30) N. Bucharin, a.a.O., SS. 21-22. 
31) Yuzo Degl1chi, Economic Melhodoioft),oj Max Weber, p. 74. 
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to explain the relationship between totality and partiality, there is no way left for 
teleology but to convern itself with the theory of causality. "If any study is to be 
pursued in a concrete way, it should concern itself with society, because it is not 
until society as one whole totality is concerned thaf the impulsive consciousness of 
man who is cognitive of his own existence at every moment can be substantially 
prescribed to the fullest extent."") In other words when the entity of action 
concerns itself consciously with the whole process of society, individual conduct or 
reality inevitably can not help concerning itself with the trend of development of 
society as whole or the ultimate purpose of society. In this way it is only when 
an individual actuality in the category of totality is appraised as a medium of his tori-
cal growth that it can have any meaning. "It is not until speculation comes to 
manifest itself in the form of reality or as a medium in the total process that it can 
overcome its own inflexibility dialectically and can be attributed with the nature 
of growth. In the meantime what is meant by growth is to serve as a medium 
between past and future. ...... The concrete "here" and "now" which may pass 
away in the process, even if it may be an instant that may pass away, can be an 
opportunity to provide a very deep and extensive mediator to produce something 
new,"33) 
m Combined Labour and Cooperative Consciousness 
I t is not reasonable to say that there is no problem in the way Lukacs put his 
ideas into shape merely on the grounds that Lukacs denigrated materialism based 
on natural science as maintained by Bukharin and criticised the objectivism which 
found its way into the III International as pseudo-objectivism. Although it is 
true that Lukacs certainly intended to accept the idea ofthe active part to be played 
by consciousness in Marxism in the past and that by doing so consciousness to pave 
a road to the future was cleverly conceived, his dialectic based on identity of specu-
lation and existence or the relationship between subjective and objective entity that 
was brought forth only to overcome simple objectivism was of an extremely deter-
ministic nature as far as the problem of the bearer of this consciousness and the 
structure of its existence were concernedH ). The first problem to begin with in 
this connection is the fact that Lukacs, by dividing this consciousness into individual-
and class-consciousness, raised sharp criticism of his own presumption that individual 
consciousness is bourgeois consciousness. It can be seen that this view comes to a 
rupture with existentialism, which accepts the idea of the role of consciousness in the 
same way, and for that reason existentialists in turn look upon Lukacs as being 
32) G. Lukics, G,sehicht, und Klassenb,wussls,in, SS. 61-62. 
33) G. Lukics, a.a.O., S. 223. 
34) L. Goldmann, Sci,nces ,[ philosophi" 1952. 
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prejudiced with objectivism. What we should solve is not only concerned with 
how to clear a path from class to individual but also to open a path from class to 
individual'·'). The author intends to further discuss this problematical question of 
today's Marxism at some other opportunity. 
The second problem lies in the epistemological way through which Lukacs, by 
prescribing that class-consciousness is determined by "the form of position occupied 
in the process of production", grasped class-consciousness. Undoubtedly Lukacs 
attitude is based on a footing of conduct or action on the one hand. However, on 
the other, once consciousness is taken up it is interpreted as a mere reflection of the 
structure of objective existence and the relationship between cognition and conduct 
is unified by the Hegelian concept of cognition. According to this idea the "dialec-
tic to produce history" is found retreating and the "dialectic to grasp history" is 
found advancing forward. For that reason if consciousness were to perceive exis-
tence properly, it would appear as ifrevolution might be possible. It is all because 
the structure of existence is grasped in the form of consciousness that it would 
ultimately lead to the formation of the system of an idea that is locked up by the 
identity of consciousness and existence. In short, this idea would say that the very 
process through which proletarian consciousness might logically pursue its once 
denied or alienated state would become identical with the process of revolution, 
which is an idea of the same kind asserted in the Logic of Self-Consciousness by Prof. 
Kakehashi36 ). When the entity of revolution is sought in consciousness, subjective 
radicalism is produced, and when it is sought in the existence of the proletariat or 
the spontaneity of an objective form of production, opportunism is produced. 
When Lukacs ascribes the identity of consciousness and existence to the con-
sciousness of the proletariat, it is necessary that a further question should be raised 
as to the structure of such class-consciousness. In this case it is impossible for us 
to grasp consciousness as something living and existence as something dead. Viewed 
from the standpoint of conduct or action, existence in the form of history must 
also be something to gain upon consciousness. Furthermore, since class-con-
sciousness in itself is something prescribed by the structure of actual proletarian 
35) Adam Schaff, Fitosofia cztowieka, 1962. 
36) This represents the significance of "Kakehashi's Economic Philosophy" a discussion of which 
was given in an other paper, referring to the meanings of Prof. Kakehashi's "System of Economic 
Philosophy", one of the most painstaking original works in the field of economic philosophy in 
this country: Ritsumeikan UniL'ersity Economics, Vol Xl, No.5 & 6, February 1963. However, 
according to Prof. Kakehashi, since the 'dialectic to grasp history' is advanced forward, as in the 
case of Lukacs, the entity of being self-conscious had to be taken as a conscious activity of life. 
AccordinglYJ since the way Prof. Kakehashi grasps "parallel existence" is one .. sided, the process 
of labour which should be a conscious activity of life has never been grasped in a concrete shape 
and it could not but lead to the "Theory of Petty-Bourgeois Self-Consciousness". What supports 
this "Theory of Self-Consciousness" is considered by the author to be "Combined Labour": 
Adam Schaff, ibid., p. 148. 
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existence, it is once again necessary to consider the problem of class-consciousness 
in contract to the process of production. In short the realistic foundation of "the 
identity of existence and consciousness" must by all means be solved. In this case 
the relationship to production (or man) brought about in the process of physical 
metabolism between man and nature should be the foundation for class-conscious-
ness. In this sense we are obliged to go back to the category of parallel existence 
in terms of the production-process of Marx, and therein lies, I think, the link 
combining the Economic~ philosophical IVlanuscripts with German Ideology. It can be 
said that the string to tie the early and later stages of Marx together can also be 
found there. Moreover, the foundation of the realistic existence of Lukacs' class-
consciousness can be brought to light by this idea of combined labour. In this 
connection it was Bukharin who underlined the significance of this basic principle 
of combined labour in capitalist society, though only in the limited sense of pro-
ductive power. It is noteworthy that this category had been drawn from Capital 
in those days when German Ideology had not yet been published to make it the 
foundation of 'something social', and it can also be easily seen that there would be 
no other way to break through Lukacs' idea of class-consciousness unless such a 
category of some social relationship based on the principle of such combined 
labour should be taken up. 
Bukharin, contrariwiseiy to Lukacs, conceived on the other side of conscious-
ness and still on the farther side of collective consciousness one realistic totality which 
was composed of the constant mutual interactions of the individual elements of 
society. It is, so to speak, some objective and spontaneous process of history which 
. is unpercievable and unorganisable. It has definitely the nature of objectivism 
in the sense that the structure of existence on the rear side of Lukacs' class-con-
sciousness is questioned. "As far as there exists one sphere of constant mutual 
interaction, there should exist one specific system, or one specific realistic totality. 
And a society ought to be neither more or less than a system composed of the 
most extensive mutual interaction which includes all ever-lasting interaction 
taking place among men."37) The idea of such interaction was drawn from 
Plekhanov's understanding of both Hegel and Bukharin, recognizing the lawfulness 
peculiar to the social process in such interaction, called the "Condition of Social 
Equilibrium". Then, what can that--a condition peculiar to the social process, 
or in other words the foundation by which a society can be distinguished from an-
other system--be? According to Bukharin, the original from of human social 
relationships is assumed to be the combined labour of men. "The condition of 
Equilibrium for a whole system is the combined labour of men which may par-
ticularly be called social labour or which may be, either consciously or unconsciously, 
called mutual human labour. "38) 
37) N. Bucharin, a.a.D., S. 91. 
38) N. Bucharin, a.a.O., S. 93. 
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The reI' son why combined labour is regarded as a "fundamental social com-
bination" is because society draws up energies from nature by means of such com-
bined labour and maintains its existence, and it is not simply because "the process 
of social reporduction" becomes possible. This combination provides society with 
a productive power which can not be materialised by individuals alone. In this 
connection the following quotation from Marx's Capital may be given here, 
which says that "the effect of the combined labour could either not be produced 
by isolated individual labour, or it could only be produced by a great expenditure 
of time, or on a very dwarfed scale. Not only have we here an increase in the 
productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of 
a new power, namely, the col1ective power of masses."") It was accepted by 
Bukharin that this combined labour is the carrier of the twice as strong as individual 
productive power. Furthermore, it is within this labour in copartnership that an 
individual can free himself from physical limitation to produce a new dynamic 
power. "The social combination by itself provides an individual man with a new 
power."40) The characteristic of Marxism in this sense lies in that it has established 
a road from society or a col1ective body to the individual, the converse of which 
can never be true. Needless to say generally speaking Bukharin did grasp this 
idea of social combination with emphasis on productivity, but should this pro-
ductivity be disregarded, Marxism might substantial1y be conceived just from the 
same point of view that used to be held by visionary socialism or romantic 
alienationism. Furthermore, if the point that this collective power is presumed 
to constitute an actual foundation of class-consciousness should be put out of 
mind, the motive power to overcome alienation would have to be searched for in 
subjectivity--consciousness 01' alienationism. If true, it would become impossible 
to free the proletariat to actuality only through the mere realisation of aliena-
tionism, and this result would naturally lead to criticism of bourgeois ideology such 
as Lukacs made, or to following up reminiscences of the logical process of alienation 
as Prof. Kakehashi did. It is true that the sense of alienation or the practical 
intuition of alienation may make a good springboard for action or enforcement, 
but mere thinking or speculation in itself can not materialise or actualise any 
revolution. The author is of the opinion that the realistic foundation of the 
"dialectic to produce history" and "dialectic to grasp history" should not be based 
on a consciousness which might be regarded as mere "parallel substance". It 
should be something conscious and simultaneously something to exist--"parallel 
substance" which should exist in the process of production or labour--and I 
think. in other words it would mean "combined labour". It can also be seen 
39) K. Marx, Dos Kapilal, Bd. J, S. 341. 
40) N. Bucharin, 0.0.0., S. 106. 
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that this idea could make the logic of objective possibility peculiar to Lukacs 
more realistic in this way. 
Then, it follows that the "combined labour" maintained by Bukharin must 
have a different meaning. In particular combined labour as conceived by Bukharin 
is the motive power of productivity of an objective society which is set up in op-
postition to human beings, and it is in itself something natural and material. It 
is something to be formed consciously or unconsciously and in this sense it is some-
thing having the nature of objectivism and something having natural and physical 
qualities. Nevertheless, when this category is placed on the side of the entity of 
revolution, it undergoes a complete change of meaning. The reason is because it 
is considered, according to Marxism, that the category of this combined labour or 
joint labour is not only regarded as a foundation for productive power or the rela-
tionship of production in a spontaneously produced society, but is also assumed to 
be a parent body to produce collective consciousness or cooperative consciousness 
exuviated from individuality. Putting it in reverse, the essential qualities of this 
social consciousness are conceived in the process of labour in the field in which 
combined labour operates, and capitalist society is, indeed, a society in which such 
consciousness is to come in to existence. I t is not only a carrier of productive power 
but is also the consciousness driving revolution in practice and its material power. 
The process of labour is a field where productive power is being materialised and 
at the same time a field where consciousness of the entity of revolution is being 
formed. Unless viewed in this way, Capital would mean nothing more than the 
mere recognition of laws of objective movements of capitalist society and could 
not bave any significance as a logical formation of the entity of revolution. It is 
not until such an assertion is made that the significance of the inconsistency arising 
out of the relationship of production, disclosing how badly collective power or 
combined labour is distorted under private ownership, can be brought to light. 
The author intends to make a further study of the class-consciousness brought out 
by Lukacs, digging still further down to the category of "combined labour" which 
is presumably a foundation of realism and existentialism. By doing so it is hoped 
that the link to connect the theory of consciousness and theory of organisation 
together might be elucidated. 
